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In the pre-dawn hours of Aug. 26, the hostage drama which had gripped Nicaragua for nearly one
week came to a close with the release in Managua of the last remaining captives. In all, over 70
hostages had been held captive by rival groups of former contra rebels and discharged army officers.
Nicaraguans breathed a sigh of relief that the tense standoff had finally come to an end without any
deaths or serious injuries. In particular, President Violeta Chamorro's government expressed its
satisfaction that the affair had concluded on the basis of peaceful mediation efforts, spearheaded
by former president Daniel Ortega and Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. Notwithstanding the
peaceful resolution, the showdown has created a series of new problems for the already embattled
Chamorro administration. Above all, the hostage affair highlighted the extent to which, more
than three years after taking office, Chamorro's efforts at national reconciliation have failed to
heal the scars left after nearly a decade of civil war. Instead, political polarization has deepened,
and combined with the country's seething economic crisis now threatens to undermine the very
foundations upon which the Nicaraguan peace process was built. As a result, the prospect of
"ungovernability" looms larger than ever. The hostage drama began on Aug. 19 in the mountains
of northern Nicaragua. On that day, a governmental peace delegation had travelled to the town
of Quilali, Nueva Segovia department, to meet with rebel leader Jose Angel "El Chacal" Talavera.
Talavera's Frente Norte 380 (FN-380) was the last remaining rebel group which had not moved into
one of nine special security enclaves set up by the government in May as part of efforts to encourage
rebel disarmament. Talavera had agreed to meet with the delegation in order to discuss details of
the government's amnesty and disarmament program. But in a surprise move, Talavera and an
estimated 150 former contra rebels under his command lured the delegation into a trap, taking
all 37 members of the group hostage after entering the building where the talks were to be held.
Members of the peace delegation included Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) deputies
Doris Tijerino and Carlos Gallo; National Opposition Union (UNO) deputy Anibal Martinez; the
commander and deputy commander of the government's Special Disarmament Brigade (Brigada
Especial de Desarme, BED) Lt. Col. Arnesto Soza and Maj. Ivan Portocarrero; the BED chief for
Matagalpa department, Captain Geovanni Perez; and the deputy ministers from the Labor and
Social Welfare ministries. The remainder of the kidnap victims were personnel from the BED
stationed in Quilali. The rebels highlighted the political overtones of the kidnapping by releasing
UNO's Martinez only a couple of hours later. Talavera said he would execute the remaining
hostages if the army made any attempt to resolve the situation by force. The FN-380 conditioned the
captives' release on the removal of three government officials: Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo,
army chief Gen. Humberto Ortega, and army intelligence chief Col. Lenin Cerna. Subsequent
declarations to reporters by Talavera and other FN-380 leaders suggested that the group decided
to carry out the kidnapping as a means to force the government to abandon its plans to launch a
massive military offensive on Aug. 31. That offensive had been designed to eliminate all recalcitrant
rebel groups which, as of that date, had failed to move into the security enclaves to accept the
amnesty which the legislature had approved on Aug. 17. In Managua, leaders from across the
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political spectrum condemned the kidnapping and called on the rebels to release the hostages
unharmed. The Chamorro government categorically rejected Talavera's demands, and insisted
there would be no negotiations. Meanwhile, the army dispatched over 400 troops, heavy artillery,
armored vehicles, and helicopters to bases in the north, in preparation for a possible assault on
FN-380 positions. Sandinsta Popular Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista, EPS) spokesperson Lt.
Col. Milton Sandoval said troops in the north were awaiting orders from President Chamorro. On
the evening of Aug. 20, just over 24 hours after the recontras had pulled their guns on the peace
delegation, retaliation came in the form of yet another hostage-taking. The Managua headquarters
of the UNO, where the coalition's top leadership was meeting to analyze the situation in Quilali,
was stormed by a group of 15 hooded rebels calling themselves the "Comando 40 por la Dignidad
y la Soberania." The group, led by discharged EPS Maj. Donald Domingo Mendoza, took captive
all 33 individuals present in the building at the time. The hostages included Vice President Virgilio
Godoy, former National Assembly presidents Alfredo Cesar and Miriam Arguello, and UNO leaders
Luis Sanchez, Humberto Castilla, and Wilfredo Navarro. Mendoza said all hostages would be freed
as soon as Talavera released his captives. Tensions quickly mounted as it became clear there were
few prospects for a rapid solution to the standoff. In Quilali, Talavera's men brandishing land-toair missiles and AK-47 assault rifles threatened to split his hostages up into small groups and take
them to remote mountain areas in order to undermine any possibility of an assault by the army. In
Managua, Mendoza's group wired the UNO headquarters with explosives, demanded that police
withdraw to a perimeter at least 200 meters away from the building, and said they would use their
hostages as human shields if the security forces or bands of former contras attempted to storm
the building. At first, the government took the initiative in attempting to defuse the crisis. On the
evening of Aug. 20, President Chamorro convened leaders from the FSLN, and the few members of
the UNO political council who were not in the building at the time of the kidnapping, to hammer
out a united strategy for seeking release of both groups of hostages. The three sides quickly found
common ground, pledging to fully cooperate to resolve the situation. An accord was signed by
the political leaders present establishing separate negotiating commissions to meet with each of
the two rebel groups. But before long, the government was upstaged as a protagonist in efforts
to bring an end to the hostage ordeal. In Quilali, Talavera rejected the government- appointed
commission, insisting he would only meet with a delegation led by Cardinal Obando y Bravo. He
also called for the negotiating team to include former Central Bank president Francisco Mayorga,
and Pablo Antonio Cuadra, a renowned Nicaraguan poet who sits on the editorial board of La
Prensa, the daily newspaper owned by the Chamorro family. Meanwhile, in Managua, former
president Daniel Ortega took the lead in convincing the pro-Sandinista hostage- takers to release
the UNO politicians. By Aug. 25, all but five of the hostages in Managua had been freed as a result of
Ortega's mediation efforts. Obando y Bravo, for his part, was at first reluctant toassume a mediating
role in the crisis. Over the course of the past several months, the Catholic Church hierarchy has
become increasingly critical of the Chamorro government. Obando's resistance to mediate was
widely interpreted as a reflection of his growing disaffection with the President. Nonetheless,
on Aug. 24 Obando finally agreed to participate, travelling to Quilali where he held two days of
talks with Talavera and other leaders from the FN-380. In the end, Talavera, Obando y Bravo, and
Interior Minister Alfredo Mendieta signed a seven-point accord which paved the way for release
of all remaining hostages. According to Obando y Bravo, the agreement included the following
points: * A 60-day truce covering four municipalities in northern Nicaragua: Quilali, El Jicaro,
Wiwili, and Murra. During the cease fire period, the EPS is to withdraw all its forces from these
municipalities. * Establishment by Sept. 7 of additional disarmament enclaves for rebels who intend
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to take advantage of the government's amnesty offer. * As of the date of the accord, Aug. 25, the area
around El Zungano (Nueva Segovia department) where most of Talavera's men were camped would
be officially designated as the tenth disarmament enclave. Perimeters of the enclave at El Zungano
were to be agreed on in a subsequent meeting. * The government assumed a commitment to request
that the Organization of American States-sponsored peace commission (CIAV) expand its presence
in the war zones of northern Nicaragua, increasing the number of CIAV personnel stationed in the
most conflict-ridden municipalities. * Verification of compliance with the Aug. 25 accords will be
the responsibility of delegates appointed by Obando y Bravo as well as by representatives from two
pro-UNO human rights groups. Mendieta added that, as one of the incentives used to persuade the
rebels to disarm, the government agreed to allow an unspecified number of FN-380 members to
join the police. Unofficial reports indicated that Talavera was promised the post of police chief in
one northern town. Meanwhile, within hours of release of the last hostages in Quilali, Mendoza's
group set free its five remaining captives in Managua. After prolonged negotiations with Daniel
Ortega, the next day Mendoza and his men left the UNO headquarters. The group travelled across
Managua to the airport under intense security measures. Along the route, hundreds of Sandinista
supporters cheered the group. At the airport, members of the commando group boarded a pair of
military helicopters bound for one of the security enclaves in northern Nicaragua. Repercussions
from the events of late August are likely to emerge in several key areas. Perhaps most important,
the government's carefully laid plans for putting an end to rebel activity in the countryside through
a combination of a broad amnesty for guerrillas who agree to disarm, coupled with a military
offensive against those who do not must now be reevaluated. At best, the government will have to
work to recover the momentum which had been achieved in the disarmament campaign between
May and mid-August. At worst, it will have to start the entire process over again from scratch.
Before the hostage crisis erupted, government spokespersons had expressed confidence that most
of an estimated 1,400 rebels who have taken up arms since 1991 were prepared to take advantage
of the amnesty. Many of those rebels had already moved into the special enclaves with the intent
of disarming. The fate of those 1,400 fighters is now uncertain, particularly in light of the military
implications of the accords signed by the FN-380 leaders. Reports in the Nicaraguan media, citing
observers close to the negotiations, said the accords essentially give recontra forces control over
vast stretches of northern Nicaragua. In addition, just hours after he was released, FSLN deputy
Carlos Gallo expressed concern that the army's withdrawal from certain zones as stipulated in
the accords will leave pro-Sandinista campesinos vulnerable to reprisal attacks by former contras.
Furthermore, the passions fueled by the hostage crisis provoked other demobilized former contras
and discharged EPS troops to publicly threaten to go back to war. After Chamorro's inauguration,
some 20,000 contras were demobilized, while the EPS was reduced from about 100,000 troops to
less than 16,000. Promises of land, loans and training to assist demobilized fighters from both sides
to reintegrate into civilian life have gone largely unfulfilled, provoking bitterness and resentment.
Even if the government manages to bring under control the factors pushing the country towards
a new civil war, it must now contend with its own deepened political isolation. The likelihood that
UNO will now step up the intensity of its anti-government campaign was demonstrated by Vice
President Godoy who, just minutes after he was released, said "responsibility for this affair rests
entirely" with Presidency Minister Lacayo and army chief Gen. Ortega. Godoy was also sharply
critical of Chamorro's role in the crisis, arguing that the inability to secure rapid release of the
hostages is further proof of her "lack of authority." UNO leaders pointed out that Chamorro was not
even in the country on Aug. 25 when the crisis was resolved, having travelled to Mexico to meet with
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The incident has also undermined an intense campaign by the
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government to persuade the US Congress to turn down a proposal to cut off US aid to Nicaragua.
On July 28, the Senate voted to suspend disbursement of the aid, arguing, among other things, that
civilian authorities do not exercise sufficient control over the security forces (see NotiSur, 07/30/93).
Coming less than one month after the July 21 occupation of Esteli by rebel forces which resulted
in scores of dead and wounded, constituting the worst outbreak of violence since Chamorro came
to office the hostage crisis has only further consolidated the image of chaos and anarchy touted
by those in the Senate as justification for the aid suspension. The House of Representatives is
expected to take up the issue shortly after reconvening in early September. Finally, there is the
question of the continued presence of Lacayo and Gen. Ortega in the government. On the one
hand, both appear to have been politically weakened by the recent events. On the other hand,
the possibilities for securing the resignation of Gen. Ortega in the short term seem to have been
undermined, as it is unlikely that the army will allow a major internal shakeup which could be
portrayed as the result of internal or external pressures. Questioned by reporters regarding the issue
of the continued presence of Lacayo and Gen. Ortega in the government, Daniel Ortega echoed the
sentiment expressed by Chamorro administration officials: "Nicaraguans don't really care who is
serving as presidency minister or army chief. Their concerns are over immediate responses by the
government to the massive unemployment rate, responses which will help people to confront the
problem of hunger which afflicts the country." (Sources: Inter Press Service, 08/19-21/93; United
Press International, 08/20-23/93; Reuter, 08/23/93, 08/24/93; New York Times, 08/23/93, 08/24/93,
08/26/93; Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias- Spanish news service EFE, 08/19-26/93, Agence
France-Presse, 08/20-26/93)
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